Syllabus

The Immigration and Nationality Act provides that "[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum." 8 U. S. C. § 1158(a)(1). A parallel provision in § 1225(a)(1) deems such an alien "an applicant for admission" entitled to inspection by an immigration officer. § 1225(a)(3).

Since at least 2016, U. S. Customs and Border Protection has, at times, addressed surges in arrivals at southern-border ports of entry through a practice known as "metering": officers stationed at the borderline direct noncitizens without valid travel documents to wait on the Mexican side of the line before crossing into the United States to be processed. The metering policy in effect during the relevant years was rescinded in 2021 and has not been readopted. The current Administration represents that it "seeks to retain the option" of reviving the practice. Pet. Br. 7.

Respondents — an immigrant-services organization and a class of noncitizens — brought this action under the Administrative Procedure Act, contending that metering withholds inspection and asylum-eligibility processing required by §§ 1158 and 1225. The District Court agreed and entered declaratory and injunctive relief. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that "the phrase 'arrives in the United States' encompasses those who encounter officials at the border, whichever side of the border they are standing on." 138 F. 4th 1102, 1117. Fifteen judges of the Ninth Circuit wrote or joined opinions disagreeing with that reading in connection with the denial of rehearing en banc.

Held:

1. The phrase "arrives in the United States" in 8 U. S. C. §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) does not extend to a noncitizen who is physically stopped on the Mexican side of the U. S.–Mexico border by an immigration officer at a port of entry. Pp. 4–22.

   (a) The ordinary meaning of the prepositional phrase "arrives in [a place]" is to come within that place. A person who is prevented from setting foot on U. S. soil has not arrived "in" the United States in any conventional sense of the phrase. The parenthetical that accompanies "arrives in the United States" — "(whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters)" — does not alter that meaning. It clarifies where and how an arrival may take place. It does not redefine "arrives in" to encompass a posture in which the noncitizen has been prevented from coming in. Pp. 4–9.

   (b) Reading "arrives in the United States" to require physical presence within the United States does not collapse it into the adjacent phrase "physically present in the United States." The two phrases address related but distinct categories. "Physically present in the United States" covers, among others, those whose arrival was long ago completed. "Arrives in the United States" covers those whose arrival is current — including those at a port of entry who, under the entry-fiction doctrine, are physically on U. S. soil but deemed not to have entered for purposes of the immigration laws. See Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 212 (1953); Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U. S. 228, 230 (1925); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185, 188–190 (1958). To the extent the two phrases overlap, the redundancy is of the modest, belt-and-suspenders character this Court has tolerated in other immigration statutes. See Barton v. Barr, 590 U. S. 222, 239 (2020). Pp. 9–13.

   (c) The presumption against extraterritoriality, see RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. 325 (2016), reinforces the textual reading. The phrase "arrives in the United States" carries no clear indication of extraterritorial reach. Even if the relevant inquiry proceeds to the second step of RJR Nabisco, the statute's focus — the moment at which a noncitizen "arrives in" the country — points to a location, and that location is the United States. Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155 (1993), confirms the analysis. Although Sale concerned aliens interdicted on the high seas, its reasoning rests on the territorial reach of the asylum-related provisions of the INA and on the limited scope of the non-refoulement obligation. That reasoning is not confined to the high-seas posture. Pp. 13–17.

   (d) Neither the 1998 regulation defining "arriving alien" to include those "coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry," 8 C. F. R. § 1001.1(q), nor the Charming Betsy canon, Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U. S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804), requires a different result. After Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369 (2024), an agency's regulatory gloss does not displace a court's independent reading of an unambiguous statute. The Charming Betsy canon applies only where "any other possible construction remains," 6 U. S. (2 Cranch), at 118; here, the statute's text leaves no construction by which a noncitizen stopped in Mexico has "arrived in" the United States. Pp. 17–20.

2. The case is justiciable. The District Court's class-wide declaration and individual injunctive relief remain in effect. The Government's representation that it seeks to retain the option of reviving the metering practice, combined with the continuing operation of the judgment below, presents a live controversy. Pp. 20–22.

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Opinion of the Court

Section 208 of the Refugee Act of 1980, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, provides that "[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States (whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters), irrespective of such alien's status, may apply for asylum." 8 U. S. C. § 1158(a)(1). The companion provision in 8 U. S. C. § 1225(a)(1) treats such a noncitizen as "an applicant for admission" entitled to inspection by an immigration officer.

This case asks whether the phrase "arrives in the United States" reaches a noncitizen who, at a southern-border port of entry, is physically prevented by an immigration officer from stepping across the borderline into the United States. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the phrase does. 138 F. 4th 1102, 1117. We hold that it does not. The judgment below is reversed.

I

In the years preceding this litigation, the southern border experienced periodic surges in the number of noncitizens presenting at ports of entry. In November 2016, during the Obama Administration, the Department of Homeland Security responded to more than 150,000 arrivals during Fiscal Year 2016 — a roughly 70 percent increase over Fiscal Year 2014 — by adopting a practice colloquially termed "metering." Pet. App. 14a. Under that practice, Customs and Border Protection officers stationed at the borderline directed noncitizens lacking valid travel documents to wait on the Mexican side of the line and return when capacity at the port of entry permitted them to be processed. The Trump Administration formalized the practice in 2018 through internal memoranda. The Biden Administration rescinded those memoranda in November 2021. No metering policy is currently in effect. The Government represents, however, that "the United States considers metering a critical tool for addressing border surges" and "seeks to retain the option of reviving the practice." Pet. Br. 7.

Respondents — an immigrant-services organization and a class of noncitizen plaintiffs — sued under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U. S. C. § 706(1), contending that metering withholds duties of inspection and asylum-eligibility processing that 8 U. S. C. §§ 1158 and 1225 impose. After a series of orders, the District Court for the Southern District of California entered declaratory and injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in an original opinion, then issued an amended opinion holding that "the phrase 'arrives in the United States' encompasses those who encounter officials at the border, whichever side of the border they are standing on." 138 F. 4th, at 1117. Rehearing en banc was denied; fifteen judges of the Ninth Circuit wrote or joined opinions disagreeing with the panel's reading. We granted certiorari.

II

We begin with the text. Esquivel-Quintana v. Sessions, 581 U. S. 385, 391 (2017).

Two parallel statutory phrases govern the question presented. Section 1158(a)(1) speaks of an alien who is "physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States." Section 1225(a)(1) speaks of "[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States." Both phrases are followed by the same parenthetical: "(whether or not at a designated port of arrival and including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters)."

The crux of respondents' theory is that the phrase "arrives in the United States" reaches a noncitizen who has not crossed the borderline so long as that noncitizen is at the borderline addressing a U. S. immigration officer. The Ninth Circuit accepted that theory and concluded that "arrives in the United States" encompasses those "encounter[ing] officials at the border, whichever side of the border they are standing on." 138 F. 4th, at 1117.

That reading replaces the statutory text with text Congress did not enact. Congress did not write "arrives at the United States," nor "arrives at the border of the United States," nor "presents to an official of the United States." It wrote "arrives in the United States." The preposition "in" carries its ordinary meaning. To "arrive in [a place]" is to come within that place; one does not arrive "in" a country by being stopped on the foreign side of the line that separates that country from another. The dictionary definitions, the corpus-linguistic evidence canvassed by the panel dissent below, see 138 F. 4th, at 1146 (R. Nelson, J., dissenting), and the ordinary speech of those who use the phrase all converge on the same point.

The parenthetical does not change that conclusion. Its function is to specify where and how an arrival may take place. The phrase "whether or not at a designated port of arrival" addresses those who cross between ports — for example, those who walk across an unguarded portion of the line — and clarifies that the asylum statute reaches them as well. The phrase "including an alien who is brought to the United States after having been interdicted in international or United States waters" addresses a separate scenario — interdicted noncitizens whom the United States has chosen to bring to its territory — and clarifies that such individuals, once brought to the United States, are likewise covered. Neither phrase contemplates a noncitizen who has not crossed the line and whom the United States has not chosen to bring across. Indeed, the second phrase confirms the contrary. It expressly addresses those who have been "brought to the United States." A noncitizen who has not been brought, and who has not crossed, is not covered by it.

Respondents reply that the present-tense verb "arrives" — as opposed to past-tense "arrived" or present-progressive "arriving" — indicates coverage of those in the process of arriving. We do not think the tense bears that weight. The present-tense form "arrives" describes the moment at which arrival occurs; it does not extend coverage to a person who is prevented from arriving at all. Standard usage confirms the point. "The flight arrives in Chicago at 6 p.m." describes the moment of arrival. It does not describe a passenger who is held in Toronto and never reaches the gate.

III

Respondents next contend that any reading of "arrives in the United States" that requires physical presence in the United States collapses the phrase into the adjacent phrase "physically present in the United States" and so violates the surplusage canon. We disagree.

The two phrases address different categories of noncitizens. "Physically present in the United States" covers, among others, the great mass of noncitizens within the country whose process of arrival is no longer current — those who have settled, those who have remained beyond a period of authorized stay, those who have come and stayed. "Arrives in the United States" covers those whose arrival is current. The most important category covered by the second phrase, and not by the first, comprises noncitizens who have stepped onto U. S. soil at a port of entry. Under the entry-fiction doctrine, such a noncitizen is, "in theory of law," at the boundary line — physically present in the United States but not yet "entered" for purposes of the immigration laws. Kaplan v. Tod, 267 U. S. 228, 230 (1925) ("She was still in theory of law at the boundary line and had gained no foothold in the United States."); Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U. S. 206, 212 (1953) (alien "on the threshold of initial entry stands on a different footing"); Leng May Ma v. Barber, 357 U. S. 185, 188–190 (1958).

The entry fiction is not an antiquated formality. It is the longstanding mechanism through which Congress and this Court have accommodated the constitutional and statutory distinction between "presence" and "entry." Because a noncitizen at a port of entry who has crossed the line is, by physical fact, "in" the United States but by legal status not yet "admitted," Congress had reason to use a phrase — "arrives in the United States" — that captures that intermediate status. The dual phrasing in §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) reflects that structure. "Physically present in" reaches those within the country; "arrives in" reaches those at ports of entry who are within the country but whose arrival is not yet legally complete.

This reading also makes coherent the relationship between § 1158 and § 1157. Section 1157 governs "the admission of refugees who seek admission from foreign countries." INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U. S. 421, 433 (1987). Section 1158 governs "the process by which refugees currently in the United States may be granted asylum." Id., at 433. The two provisions implement different functions. Respondents' reading bridges that gap by treating a noncitizen on the Mexican side of the border — a noncitizen "from a foreign country" within the meaning of § 1157 — as a noncitizen "in the United States" within the meaning of § 1158. That is not what Congress designed.

To the extent the dual phrasing in § 1158(a)(1) produces any residual overlap, the redundancy is of a kind this Court has tolerated. In Barton v. Barr, the Court accepted that "[s]ometimes the better overall reading of the statute contains some redundancy." 590 U. S. 222, 239 (2020). The redundancy here is modest. The drafter who chose "physically present in or arrives in" did so against the backdrop of the entry-fiction cases of which Congress was plainly aware. See H. R. Rep. No. 96–608, p. 17 (1979). Belt-and-suspenders drafting in the immigration laws is unsurprising, and it is no warrant for reading "arrives in the United States" to mean its opposite.

IV

The presumption against extraterritoriality independently supports our reading. The presumption holds that "[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be construed to have only domestic application." RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U. S. 325, 326 (2016). At the first step of the inquiry, we ask whether the statute "gives a clear, affirmative indication that it applies extraterritorially." Ibid. The phrase "arrives in the United States" supplies no such indication. To the contrary, the phrase is bounded by the words "in the United States."

The presumption "has special force when we are construing treaty and statutory provisions that may involve foreign and military affairs for which the President has unique responsibility." Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U. S. 155, 188 (1993). The administration of ports of entry implicates that core. Customs and Border Protection officers stationed at the borderline interact with persons whose travel between sovereign nations is governed by international agreement and by the laws of two countries. Reading § 1225's mandatory-inspection command to apply to persons standing on the Mexican side of that line would require U. S. officials to administer the immigration laws of the United States to persons who, by petitioner's premise, are within the jurisdiction of Mexico.

Sale itself addressed the question of how the INA's protections apply to noncitizens who have not reached U. S. soil. Although the statutory provision interpreted there was § 243(h)(1) — the predecessor to current 8 U. S. C. § 1231(b)(3) — and although the operational posture concerned high-seas interdiction, the Court's reasoning rested on principles broader than its facts. The Court began from the proposition that "[t]he INA offers these statutory protections only to aliens who reside in or have arrived at the border of the United States." 509 U. S., at 160. It construed § 243(h) to apply only to "proceedings to deport aliens already in the country and proceedings to exclude those already at the border." Id., at 156. And it concluded that neither the statute nor Article 33 of the 1967 Protocol "limits the President's power to order the Coast Guard to repatriate undocumented aliens intercepted on the high seas." Id., at 155.

Respondents distinguish Sale on two grounds. First, they argue, Sale concerned a different verb — "return" — in a different statutory provision. Second, they argue, Sale concerned the conduct of U. S. officials on the high seas, whereas metering involves U. S. officials on U. S. soil. Neither distinction overcomes Sale's force.

The verb distinction is a difference of vocabulary, not of principle. Sale held that the asylum-related provisions of the INA do not protect noncitizens who have not reached the United States or the border of the United States. 509 U. S., at 160, 173–177. The verb that frames a particular section does not transmute that holding when the question is whether a different section reaches noncitizens in materially the same posture. To the contrary, Sale's reasoning runs in a single direction across the asylum-related provisions: those provisions, read together, address noncitizens who have come to the United States or to the border, and not noncitizens whom the United States has prevented from coming.

The location-of-officers distinction misstates the focus inquiry. RJR Nabisco asks whether "the conduct relevant to the statute's focus occurred in the United States." 579 U. S., at 326. The focus of §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1) is on the alien — on the alien's status, presence, and posture at the relevant moment. The text makes that plain. Section 1158(a)(1) refers throughout to "[a]ny alien who is physically present in the United States or who arrives in the United States … irrespective of such alien's status." Section 1225(a)(1) refers to "[a]n alien present in the United States who has not been admitted or who arrives in the United States." The verbs ("is physically present," "arrives," "has not been admitted") describe the alien. Whether U. S. officials act on U. S. soil to administer those provisions is not the focus; whether the alien is "in the United States" is. And as to that focus, the location is fixed by the statute itself.

V

Two further arguments deserve direct response.

A

Respondents place weight on the regulation, promulgated shortly after IIRIRA, defining "arriving alien" to include "an applicant for admission coming or attempting to come into the United States at a port-of-entry." 8 C. F. R. § 1001.1(q); see 8 C. F. R. § 1.2 (same). After Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U. S. 369 (2024), the regulation does not bind us. The question is whether its longstanding character supplies independent evidence of the statute's meaning, in the manner of an agency interpretation that may "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance." Loper Bright, 603 U. S., at 392 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944)).

We do not think the regulation carries that weight here. The regulation defines a procedural category — the "arriving alien" — used in administering exclusion and expedited-removal procedures applied at ports of entry. It does not purport to define the statutory phrase "arrives in the United States" in §§ 1158(a)(1) and 1225(a)(1). The Executive Branch's adoption of one operational definition of "arriving alien" cannot rewrite the statutory phrase Congress enacted. To the extent the regulation reflects the agency's longstanding view that the inspection duty attaches at the borderline of a port of entry rather than upon a particular step across that line, the view is one the agency has held in some periods and acted against in others. The 2018 memoranda formalizing metering reflected the agency's contemporaneous view that the duty does not so attach. Longstanding practice that runs in both directions is not the kind of consistent agency interpretation that Skidmore and its successors regard as persuasive evidence of statutory meaning. See Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U. S. 142, 158 (2012).

B

Respondents also press the Charming Betsy canon. They argue that the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, to which the United States acceded in 1968, imposes a non-refoulement obligation that respondents' reading respects and the contrary reading violates. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy provides that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." 6 U. S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804).

The canon does not assist respondents. Sale held that Article 33's non-refoulement obligation does not have extraterritorial reach. 509 U. S., at 178–183. That holding controls the canon's application: where the treaty obligation does not extend extraterritorially, no canon counseling consistency with international law requires that the implementing statute be read to apply extraterritorially. The argument that our reading of § 1158 produces a result inconsistent with non-refoulement assumes the answer to a question Sale resolved twenty-five years before IIRIRA's enactment. Congress legislated in 1996 against the backdrop of Sale. Had it intended to extend asylum-related protections beyond the territorial line, it could have said so.

Even apart from Sale, the canon by its terms operates only when "any other possible construction remains." 6 U. S. (2 Cranch), at 118. Here, the statute's text leaves no construction by which a noncitizen stopped on the Mexican side of the border has "arrived in" the United States. The canon does not authorize the rewriting of unambiguous statutory text in the service of international-law harmony, however earnestly that harmony may be desired.

VI

A word, finally, on justiciability.

The Government represents that no metering policy is currently in effect and that it seeks the Court's review "in order to retain the option of reviving the practice." Pet. Br. 7. Justices at oral argument pressed both sides on whether that posture renders the case inappropriate for merits resolution and whether vacatur of the District Court's declaration would be the better remedy. Tr. of Oral Arg. 32–35, 62–65.

We hold that the case is justiciable. The District Court's class-wide declaration and the individual injunctive relief entered for one plaintiff remain in effect. Those rulings continue to constrain the Executive Branch from reinstating metering of any form, whatever changes in border conditions might arise. The Government's stated intention to retain the option, combined with the live operation of the judgment below, presents a controversy capable of judicial resolution. We do not reach the question whether, on a different procedural posture, vacatur or remand without decision would be a permissible course. On the record before us, the question is presented, has been thoroughly briefed and argued, and admits of a resolution. We give it one.

VII

The Federal Government's authority to control the entry of noncitizens into the United States is "a fundamental act of sovereignty." United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U. S. 537, 542 (1950). That authority is, in the first instance, the Executive's to exercise within the bounds Congress sets. Ibid. When Congress enacted the asylum and inspection provisions of the INA in their current form, it set those bounds by reference to noncitizens "physically present in the United States" or who "arrive[] in the United States." It did not extend those provisions to noncitizens whom the United States has prevented from arriving at all. The Court of Appeals' contrary reading rests on a verb-tense argument the statute does not support, a surplusage objection the entry-fiction doctrine answers, and a regulatory gloss that Loper Bright removes from the field. None of these objections, alone or together, displaces what the statute says.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.